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DEAD MAN WAITING:
DEATH ROW DELAYS, THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT,
AND WHAT COURTS AND LEGISLATURES CAN DO
KATE McMAHON*
INTRODUCTION: SOERING V. UNITED KINGDOM AND THE MODERN
LANDSCAPE OF THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY
Around dinnertime in the early spring of 1985, the parents
of Elizabeth Haysom were stabbed to death in their Virginia home.
Elizabeth was, by all accounts, a deeply troubled young woman
who had recently entered into a symbiotic relationship with Jens
Soering, an 18-year old German national also studying at the
University of Virginia. Subsequent investigation into the stabbings
revealed that Soering had likely committed the brutal acts at the
behest of Elizabeth. Over one year later, Soering was indicted by a
grand jury in the Commonwealth of Virginia and charged with the
murders.
At the time of Soering's indictment, he and Elizabeth,
having earlier fled to Europe, were being detained in England on
charges of check fraud. Soon after, the United States invoked the
relevant extradition treaty to request that Soering be released back
to Virginia so that he could face his murder charges there. The
United Kingdom, cognizant of the fact that Soering would likely
face the death penalty in Virginia whereas capital punishment had
since been abolished in Great Britain, paused to consider the impli-
cations of extradition. The Embassy issued a request to the United
States asking for assurance that in the case of Soering's extradition
to the U.S., appropriate authorities of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia would be alerted not to pursue Soering's execution. Indeed,
no such assurances were made, and despite the issuance of a simi-
lar extradition application from Germany, the U.K. continued to
consider the United States' request.
* J.D. 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Boston College,
2003.
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When at last the United Kingdom's Secretary of State
reluctantly agreed to sign a warrant ordering Soering's surrender,
Soering appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
As it happened, while the extradition requests were pending the
British proceedings had generated a substantial amount of psychi-
atric evidence calling into question Soering's maturity and mental
state. More significantly, Soering had fashioned a novel new claim
that in the event the U.K. extradited him to Virginia and it resulted
in his incarceration on death row there, it would be the functional
equivalent of the U.K. exposing Soering to psychological torture
and would thus violate Article 3 of the European Convention of
Human Rights providing that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
Interestingly, the tenor of Soering's argument rested in an
emerging legal concept he identified as "death row phenomenon."
The claim was that a "syndrome" manifests itself when persons are
forced to endure the extreme conditions of death row and the leng-
thy delays which accompany it-usually six to eight years at that
time in Virginia according to the ECHR, depending on the number
of appeals a defendant decided to pursue. Soering maintained that
"during [this] time he would be subject to increasing tension and
psychological trauma... his future detention on 'death row'...
where he expects to be the victim of violence and sexual abuse
because of his age, colour and nationality; and the constant spectre
of execution itself, including the ritual of execution."I
The ECHR considered this and other claims, and in a
landmark decision on July 7, 1989, it concluded that implementa-
tion of Soering's extradition under these circumstances would
indeed violate Article 3 of the Convention.2 While explaining that
the American institution of the death penalty could still be squared
with democratic ideals, the Court was nevertheless persuaded by
the notion that "the condemned prisoner has to endure for many
years the conditions on death row and the anguish and mounting
'Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in I 1
Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989).2 1d at I11.
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tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death."3 Taking
account of the length of time someone in Virginia must remain on
death row-as well as more immediate concerns regarding Soering's
age and mental condition, the ECHR determined that extradition
with possible exposure to death row would implicate evolving
mores of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.
4
Is there a point at which a person's tenure on death row has
lasted so long or has become so stressful that his sentence begins to
violate the Constitution? The language of our own Eighth Amend-
ment very much reflects those same values embodied in Article 3
of the European Convention. That said, the Soering decision has
several times proven important in the American context, and will
likely take on new significance as average tenures on death row
grow exponentially and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence con-
tinues to evolve.
Since the practice of capital punishment in the United
States was reinstated in 1976,5 the claim that prolonged incarcera-
tion on death row could violate Eighth Amendment notions of
"cruel and unusual punishment" has only appeared a handful of
times in state supreme courts. In the 1999 case Knight v. Florida,
the United States Supreme Court consolidated two of these cases
on appeal from Florida and Nebraska.6 The majority opinion
denied certiorari on the issue, which had by now gained notoriety
as the Lackey claim,7 with Justice Thomas concurring that delays
are an inevitable function of our procedures for safeguarding the
death penalty. 8 Although the two petitioners in Knight had been on
3 Id. at 106 (emphasis added)
4 id.
5 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (holding that the practice of capi-
tal punishment does not invariably violate the U.S. Constitution).
6 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (consolidated with Moore v.
Nebraska).
7 Id. I will use the term "Lackey" claim interchangeably with claims of death
row syndrome and death row phenomenon, although Lackey claim refers more
specifically to the Eighth Amendment argument made out in American jurisdic-
tions. Death row syndrome and death row phenomenon are more universally
applicable legal concepts, discussed in more depth in Section II.
8 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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death row for nearly 20 and 25 years respectively, he reasoned that
a lengthy amount of time alone could not render a prisoner's
punishments cruel and unusual.9 Thomas intimated that most
delays in execution are the result of an inmate's own decisions to
exhaust appeals, and therefore granting certiorari here would only
provide incentives for offenders to manipulate the appeals process.
Where in Lackey v. Texas Justice Stevens had invited state courts
to serve as "laboratories" to test the viability of such a consti-
tutional argument,'0 Justice Thomas now submitted that "the Court
should consider the experiment concluded.""
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Breyer questioned the retri-
butive and deterrent justifications for imposition of the death
penalty in cases where defendants had already been detained on
death row for several decades.12 Breyer proceeded to catalogue the
way in which various foreign courts had interpreted legal standards
comparable to those embodied in our own constitution-including
the ECHR in the Soering case-and had found lengthy delays in
otherwise lawful executions to have the potential for being imper-
missibly inhumane.' 3 He also took issue with the characterization
that this constitutional question had been definitively resolved in
the state-level laboratory, instead asserting that very few courts had
directly addressed the Eighth Amendment implications in cases
where the state could be said to bear some of the responsibility for
an offender's prolonged incarceration. Therefore, Breyer argued
that "although the experiment may have begun, it is hardly evident
that we 'should consider the experiment concluded.',14
Since Knight, the Supreme Court has handed down two
momentous decisions vindicating abolitionist principles in the area
of the death penalty. In 2003, Justice Stevens, writing for a
majority in Atkins v. Virginia, held that executing a mentally
retarded person violates the "cruel and unusual" clause of the
9 Id. at 992.
10 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
" Knight, 528 U.S. at 993.
12 Id. at 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 995-996.
14 id.
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Eighth Amendment.' 5 In 2005, Stevens announced that the Eighth
Amendment also prohibits imposing the death penalty on juvenile
offenders in Roper v. Simmons.' 6 Both opinions refer to "evolving
standards of decency"' 7 considerations necessitating prohibition of
death sentences in certain circumstances, with an eye towards
international ideals.
Whereas over the last five years the Eighth Amendment has
substantially chipped away at the constitutionally permissible
parameters of capital punishment, the current legal landscape
surrounding the death penalty may be poised for more upheaval.
Because so few courts have squarely addressed the validity of such
a claim, and because there is strong indication that unusually long
exposure on death row could implicate evolving standards of
decency, our courts should re-explore the merits of a Lackey chal-
lenge. The first step is convincing courts to recognize the "cruel
and unusual" implications of the "death row phenomenon,"
explained in Part I by a closer examination of death row
conditions, death penalty justifications, and foreign opinion sur-
rounding the issue of delay. If the courts do decide to acknowledge
the potential of such a claim, the next step is to then identify the
line at which a constitutional confinement on death row becomes
unconstitutionally lengthy. Part II discusses the many considera-
tions which must factor into this sort of delicate balancing act, so
that state legislatures and courts alike can guard against future
Eighth Amendment violations in a system where efficiency may be
at odds with decency.
I. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE CASE FOR
DEATH Row PHENOMENON
The Eighth Amendment does not support the execution of
persons in instances where certain social principles will not be
vindicated by imposition of the death penalty. Moreover, questions
"5 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
16 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
7 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312; Roper, 543 U.S. at 561.
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regarding cruelty and unusual treatment are raised when punish-
ments become so heinous or barbarous that they fall outside the
bounds of constitutionality. As outlined below, conditions of death
row confinement can be so psychologically taxing that prolonged
exposure often proves torturous on the prisoner, provoking legiti-
mate Eighth Amendment concerns. Such concerns have become
increasingly commonplace in the international community, and
lend credibility to the notion of a death row phenomenon and the
legal legitimacy of an Eighth Amendment claim where inmates are
languishing for several decades awaiting execution.
A. Death Penalty Justifications, Eighth Amendment
Limits, and J.B. Hubbard
Any interpretation of the scope of the Eighth Amendment's
"cruel and unusual punishment" provision will turn on "its text, by
considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard
for its purpose and function in the constitutional design."' 8 The
Supreme Court realizes that the reach of the Eighth Amendment is
not fixed or precise; rather, "[t]he basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man ... The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 9
In 2004, J.B. Hubbard became the oldest person to be
executed in over six decades in the United States. 20 At the time of
the Alabama execution, the twice-convicted murderer was 74
years-old and had spent 27 years on death row. The Washington
Post reported that prior to his execution, Hubbard suffered from
colon and prostate cancer, hypertension, and "spasms of demen-
tia," and that his health was so deteriorated that his fellow death
row inmates often had to help bathe him and wash his hair.2 1
18 Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
19 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
20 Manuel Roig-Franzia, Alabama Executes 74-Year Old Man: Infirm Convict's
Death Spurs Debate on Age, Appeals Process, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2004.
21 Id
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Hubbard's execution highlighted mounting tensions sur-
rounding a nationwide system in which lengthy appeals often
result in inordinately long delays on death row. Hours before Hub-
bard's death, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on his last peti-
tion for a stay of execution by just a five-to-four margin, indicating
that there was at least a palpable argument that executing a man in
these circumstances had the potential for being constitutionally
problematic. 22 After the execution, even the district attorney prose-
cuting Hubbard's case exclaimed to a reporter "[i]t's ridiculous-
unconscionable-for any process to take this long. 23
At the time the Constitution was drafted, the Framers were
familiar with a system where the interim between conviction and
execution would be a matter of days or weeks, not years or
decades.24 Our contemporary system of capital punishment has
since undergone a variety of reforms, most of which have been
targeted at restricting a practice many characterize as being arbi-
trary in its administration. Undoubtedly, increasingly long appeals
and prolonged detentions on death row are the inevitable conse-
quences of providing additional procedures to safeguard the area of
the death penalty. Justice Thomas noted as much when he denied
the Eighth Amendment claim in Knight v. Florida, announcing that
it would be "incongruous to arm capital defendants with an arsenal
of 'constitutional' claims with which they may delay their
executions, and simultaneously to complain when executions are
invariably delayed. 25
However, while the Supreme Court has several times
denied certiorari on this issue, Justices Breyer and Stevens have
often dissented, parsing the terms "cruel" and "unusual" to con-
clude that this question fairly deserves to be addressed in instances
where delays on death row reach an abnormal magnitude.
2 6
22 Hubbard v. Campbell, 542 U.S. 958 (2004).
2' Roig-Franzia, supra note 20.
24 Death Penalty Information Center: Time on Death Row [hereinafter DPIC],
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did = 1397.
25 Knight, 528 U.S. at 992.
26 Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Hubbard's execution in particular illustrates that in certain cases it
might not be reasonable to assume that that such long death row
delays always comport with the constitution or with the social
purposes underwriting the death penalty.
When the Supreme Court in 1976 announced the death
penalty did not uniformly violate the Eighth Amendment in Gregg
v. Georgia, thus ending a 10 year moratorium on the practice, it
emphasized that capital punishment is constitutionally justified by
two principles: deterrence and retribution.27 In the situation where
an ailing 74-year old man has already spent twenty-seven years on
death row, however, it is difficult for any observer to discern how
his execution definitively serves either social purpose. The state
can arguably be said to have already furthered its retributive goals
by subjecting the offender to endure almost three decades in near-
solitary confinement, perhaps constituting a separate punishment
distinct from execution, which begins to implicate notions of
double-jeopardy. The state will also need to establish that deter-
rence principles are vindicated by imposition of the death penalty.
Once again, this burden will be hard to make in instances where
the state has determined to kill a man so feeble at the time of his
execution that he is unable even to wash his own hair.
B. Conditions of Confinement: Death Row
Syndrome and the Ross Case
Soering's portrait of a so-called "death row phenomenon"
has achieved new relevance in light of extreme fact-patterns like
Hubbard's and relatively sympathetic opinions by Justices Stevens
and Breyer in similar cases. 28 The Department of Justice reported
that capital offenders in the United States between 1977 and 2004
had spent an average of ten years and two months on death row
anticipating execution, up seven months from the average calcu-
27 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183
28 See Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990
(2002)
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lated from 1977-2003 .29 That same document also reported that the
number of actual executions had marginally decreased in 2004,
those figures illustrating a system that is only getting more clogged
and unworkable as time progresses. As more and more prisoners
languish for unprecedented lengths of time on death row, more
situations like Hubbard's will inevitably emerge and spark debate.
The Death Penalty Information Center reports that those
inmates stuck in limbo may spend up to 23 hours a day alone in
their cell. 30 The Supreme Court has said that this time spent
awaiting death is generally characterized by unnerving uncertainty
about when or how the an execution will take place, constituting
"one of the most horrible feelings to which [a person] can be
subjected .... Justice Breyer has directly called attention to the
viability of this assertion, stating that "it is difficult to deny the
suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution-a matter
which courts and judges have long recognized., 32 The dissent to
denial of certiorari in Knight cites other judicial opinion calling
attention to the "dehumanizing effects" of long periods spent on
death row which take "a frightful toll" on inmates, often resulting
in an "onset of insanity." 33 A study of Florida prisoners cited by
Breyer, found that 42% of persons on death row had seriously con-
sidered suicide and 35% had actually attempted it, demonstrating
29 Thomas B. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Capital
Punishment, 2004, Nov. 2005, NCJ 211349, at 11, available at http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp04.pdf. This figure is misleading for many reasons,
explained also in Section II below. Most significantly, this figure looks at the
average time spent on death row each year since 1976, then averages those
figures. Inmates on death row in 2004 had been on death row an average of 132
months, or just over II years at the time of the report. This figure also assumes
that length of death row confinement begins at the last sentencing date. In
actuality, many death row inmates have been sentenced several times, so this
figure would not reflect that.
30 DPIC, supra note 24.
31 In Re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (court evaluated the constitutionality
of a four week delay from sentencing to execution).
32 Knight, 528 U.S. at 994 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33 id.
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that psychological instability wrought by extended periods await-
ing execution is a serious issue.
34
No recent case more compellingly demonstrates the legal
import of this phenomenon than the Connecticut case State v.
Ross.35 In January of 2005, just one hour before Michael Ross was
set to die for murders he committed in 1984, Connecticut decided
to stay his execution pursuant to last-minute motions filed by Ross'
lawyer alleging that his client was suffering from death row syn-
drome. 36 Ross, having spent much of death row in solitary confine-
ment, had long-insisted he was competent to volunteer for execu-
tion and had thus waived all further appeals of his sentence. In a
series of dramatic events at the eleventh hour, his lawyer issued a
statement saying that "new and significant evidence has come to
light that I simply cannot ignore" regarding Ross' competency to
waive his appeals, suggesting instead that prison conditions had
coerced Ross into a suicidal state. 37 This evidence came in the
form of a letter from another inmate who had spoken to Ross
through vents and had heard him describe certain prison workers as
"sociopaths in disguise," "engineering" Ross' will to die, in addi-
tion to other affidavits from individuals suggesting that Ross was
suffering from death row syndrome and that his acute levels of
despair and depression were inciting him to commit suicide
through execution. 38 A former warden corroborated that it wasn't
abnormal for prison staff to comment that it would be easier on
everybody if death row inmates just killed themselves.39 He further
testified that the atmosphere in the Connecticut prison's death row
resembled "living in a submarine or cave."''4 In fact, Michael Ross
had already attempted to kill himself on three different occasions. 4 1
34 Id at 995 (citing Strafer, Volunteeringfor Execution, 74 J. Crim. L. & C. 860,
872, n. 44 (1983)).
35 State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 145 n. 19 (Conn. 2005).
36 William Yardley & Stacey Stowe, Connecticut Delays Death of Serial Killer
Indefinitely, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005.
37 id
38 id.
39 id
40 DPIC, supra note 24.
41 id
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While Ross's lawyer was able to successfully secure ano-
ther competency hearing to determine whether his client retained
the proper mental state to elect to die, the court ultimately found
that Ross was fit to volunteer for execution. In the course of its
determination, however, the court specified that the only "color-
able claim" advanced by Ross's lawyers was that Ross might be
suffering from death row syndrome, a seeming re-invitation to
explore the weight of the Soering decision as applied in the
American context.42 Characterizing death row syndrome as a legal
concept that may or may not exist, the court nonetheless enter-
tained court papers prepared by psychiatrist and former Harvard
Medical Professor Dr. Stuart Grassian stating:
The conditions of confinement are so oppressive, the
helplessness endured in the roller coaster of hope and
despair so wrenching and exhausting, that ultimately
the inmate can no longer bear it, and then it is only in
dropping his apTpeals that he has any sense of control
over his fate..."
The Connecticut Supreme Court, deciding that Michael Ross
was competent to waive his appeals, ruled to reinstate his execu-
tion, and on May 13, 2005, he became the first person executed by
a state in New England in 45 years. 44 At the time of his execution,
Michael Ross had spent upwards of 17 years on death row.
45
State v. Ross is an interesting study in several respects.
First, Ross illustrates potential judicial discomfort concerning
competency when condemned prisoners volunteer to die. There is a
fine line between the constitutional scenario where an inmate
competently waives his appeals, and the unconstitutional scenario
in which an inmate, having been exposed to intensely long periods
of near-solitary confinement, is no longer able to stand his condi-
42 Ross, 873 A.2d at 145 n.19.
43 DPIC, supra note 24.
44 id
45 Avi Salzman, Killer's Fate May Rest on New Legal Concept, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2005.
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tions and desperately waives his appeals in order to put an end to
his own anguish. Tellingly, the chain of events resulting in Ross's
final litigation was actually sparked by Robert N. Chatigny, a U.S.
District Court judge who was so concerned that Michael Ross's
mental state might fall in this latter, unconstitutional category that
he threatened to disbar Ross's lawyer if he didn't adequately inves-
tigate new evidence regarding his client's psychological sound-
ness.46 Such unease on the part of judges has broad implications
for opening the way for new discussion of death row syndrome.
Second, Ross is compelling in the sense that it was not Ross
himself promulgating the Soering argument. Ross was willing to
die and had said as much on several occasions. Unlike the scenario
Justice Thomas had envisioned in Knight, Ross's 17-year incar-
ceration on death row and subsequent death row syndrome claim
was not the product of a prisoner's attempt to exploit his appeals
and then complain about the delay. Here, it was the government
intervening to assess the impact of death row conditions on Ross's
mental state. Ross, in contrast, was trying to put an end to the delay
and speed up the execution. Perhaps Connecticut's demonstrated
reluctance to impose the capital punishment here was atypical of
states, given that Connecticut had not executed anyone since the
death penalty was reinstated. However, this case at least lends
credence to Breyer's contention that Eighth Amendment inquiries
could become relevant where prolonged delays are not directly
attributable to the prisoner.
For the foregoing reasons, the death row phenomenon
presents at least a workable Eighth Amendment challenge to
enforcement of the death penalty in certain cases. This will turn on
a combination of factors, including but not limited to the length of
time someone has spent awaiting execution, the particular reasons
for the delay, and a mental state examination of the prisoner. In
any event, the Court has long recognized that the miserable nature
and conditions on death row often inflict a significant degree of
psychological harm on inmates. This has implicit Eighth Amend-
46 Yardley, supra note 36.
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ment importance that deserves thoughtful consideration in fact-
patterns where long delays have rendered punishments barbarous.
C. International Support for the "Cruel and
Unusual Punishment" Challenge
Guidance from foreign courts lends considerable support
for the notion that death row syndrome can provide the foundation
for a viable Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment"
challenge at home. It seems that the Supreme Court, in the wake of
Atkins and Roper, would be amenable to considering the opinion of
international courts if it was to grant certiorari on this claim. The
reasons are twofold: 1) because several foreign courts with
constitutions like ours have directly and carefully addressed this
issue in considerably more detail than our courts have, and 2)
because an increasing number of countries are refusing to extradite
offenders to the United States precisely because they have held our
notoriously long death row delays violate perceived international
standards of human rights.
The Eighth Amendment was molded out of a corresponding
provision of the English Declaration of Rights of 1689.4 7 When
deciding that the Constitution now forbids execution of juvenile
offenders, Justice Kennedy drew the Court's attention to the fact
the England had long ago abolished this practice, noting that "The
United Kingdom's experience bears particular relevance here in
light of the historic ties between our countries and in light of the
Eight Amendment's own origins." 48 That said, British Jurists have
found that inordinate delays awaiting execution invariably violates
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments contained in
Section 10 of that document.49 Historically speaking, those
conclusions should be highly instructive to our immediate inquiry.
While Justice Breyer recognized that foreign law does not
bind the U.S. Supreme Court, he nonetheless conceded that
47 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
48 Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
49 Lackey, 514 U.S. 1045 (quoting Riley v. Attorney General of Jamaica [1983]
1 A. C. 719, 734 (P. C. 1983)).
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reviewing corresponding foreign decisions can be very probative in
assisting our own evaluation of novel constitutional claims. His
Knight dissent of denial of certiorari cited various instances in
which the Court had in fact consulted the opinions of other
countries--"courts that accept or assume the lawfulness of the
death penalty"-to aid in its own interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's limitations. 50 In ruling on the constitutionality of
practices such as the execution of juvenile offenders, the doctrine
of felony murder, death penalty for rape, and the death penalty for
mentally retarded, United States courts have often consulted the
opinions of other former Commonwealth countries "insofar as
those opinions reflect a legal tradition that also underlies our own
Eighth Amendment." 51 In view of that, international opinion
counsels that the United States should take evolving international
standards of decency into consideration to find that the Eighth
Amendment bans lengthy detentions on death row.
This concept is no doubt controversial. Amicus curia by the
European Union in Atkins no doubt impressed Justice Stevens that
the world community "overwhelmingly" disapproved of the use of
capital punishment against mentally retarded by 200 1.52 In perhaps
one of the lengthiest expositions on international consensus,
Justice Kennedy's 2005 opinion in Roper painted a stark portrait of
America standing "alone in a world that has turned its face against
the juvenile death penalty. 53 Of course both of these recent
opinions were met with biting dissents by Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices Thomas and the now-deceased Justice Rehnquist.54 Justice
50 Knight, 528 U.S. at 994 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer discusses the decisions
of Jamaica, the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of India,
and the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. He then cites various United States
opinions.51 ld. at 997.52 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316, n.21.
5' Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
54 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the Prize for the Court's
Most Feeble Effort to fabricate "national consensus" must go to its appeal
(deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the views of assorted professional and
religious organizations, member of the so-called 'world community' . . .
irrelevant are the practices of the "world community," whose notions of justice
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O'Connor, also dissenting in Roper, nevertheless qualified her
dissent to agree with the majority that foreign and international law
are appropriate resources in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
because of that Amendment's unique character meant for mea-
suring "the maturing values of civilized society. 55 In any event,
with Rehnquist and O'Connor now gone and two new Justices on
the Court, the majorities in both Atkins and Roper are still pre-
served-Justices Breyer, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsberg
agreeing that the Eighth Amendment puts specific prohibitions on
the death penalty. Because there is supporting evidence of consen-
sus in the world community favoring a Lackey-type claim, there is
a substantial and distinct possibility that a Roberts-led Court would
be similarly persuaded to accept this argument in a grant of
certiorari.
As mentioned previously, the Court also has functional
reasons for reconsidering a Lackey argument, more directly
invoking the legacy of Soering. Extradition concerns related to the
European Court of Human Rights decision helped prompt Breyer's
1998 dissent of certiorari denial in Elledge v. Florida.5 Likewise,
he again dissented to a similar certiorari denial in 2002, noting that
the Supreme Court of Canada had just ruled that possible pro-
longed incarceration on death row was "a relevant consideration"
in deciding whether or not extradition to the United States would
violate "principles of 'fundamental justice.' ' 57 The prospect of
Canada taking inordinate delays into account in extradition
decisions has significant implications for the United States, given
that we are Canada's major extradition partner. Data suggested that
are (thankfully) not always those of our people ...."); Roper, 543 U.S. at 622
(Scalia, J. dissenting) ("Though the views of our own citizens are essentially
irrelevant to the Court's decision today, the view of other countries and the so-
called international community take center stage.").
55 Roper, 543 U.S. at 605.
56 Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("a reasoned answer to the
'delay' question could help to ease the practical anomaly created when foreign
courts refuse to extradite capital defendants to America for fear of undue delay
in execution" (referring to Soering v. United Kingdom)).
57 Foster, 537 U.S. at 992-93 (quoting United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S. C. R.
283, 353, P123).
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the U.S. accounted for 83% of the extradition requests received by
Canada between 1985 and1991.58 The import of the Soering
decision is particularly salient here, as Canada is separated from
the United States by only a land border, making it an accessible
destination for fleeing felons. Our criminal justice system would be
severely frustrated were it not able to try its worst offenders in our
own court systems simply because those offenders had absconded
north.
Hence, there are practical as well as ideological reasons
why the Court should find a constitutional abuse if it were to grant
certiorari on this issue. The changing composition of the Court
does not seem to have shifted the balance of Justices willing to
look towards consensus in the world community-particularly
towards those countries that reflect our constitutional design-in
order to evaluate the unique parameters of the Eighth Amendment.
That said, foreign opinion favors identifying a human rights
violation at some point in a prisoner's stay on death row, especially
where lengthy delays inhibit the United State's ability to prosecute
some of its worst offenders.
II. PUTTING THE CHALLENGE INTO ACTION:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR COURTS AND LEGISLATURES
Having already concluded that extremely long tenures on
death row implicate notions of cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, we are now tasked with the
challenge of figuring out how to legally prevail with such an argu-
ment. State courts and legislatures have offered us little guidance
in this arena, their silence serving only to highlight potential anxi-
eties that must be addressed in any attempt to govern this claim.
Assuming that courts should approach this as a matter of first
impression, and assuming that the death penalty itself is constitu-
tional pursuant to Gregg v. Georgia, then particularly thorny is the
job of identifying the specific point at which a permissible
58 Paul Mitchell, Domestic Rights and International Responsibilities: Extradition
Under the Canadian Charter, 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 141 (Winter 1998).
Vol. XXV
Dead Man Waiting
incarceration on death row becomes cruel and unusual. This article
submits that there is no such bright line, only relevant factors with
which prudent courts and legislatures can reasonably assess when
an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred.
A. Why Courts Should Evaluate this Claim as a
Matter of First Impression
Eighth Amendment determinations normally rest on gaug-
ing where evolving standards of decency lie; in this vein, Atkins
and Roper both sought to examine evidence of national consensus
across states to aid their inquiry. This is not so easily accomplished
in our investigation. As discussed earlier, Knight only briefly
addressed the feasibility of a "cruel and unusual punishment"
claim in instances where a prisoner had been awaiting execution on
death row for an unusually long period of time. In many respects,
this is an issue of first impression and courts should reexamine it
with a clean slate.
It remains true that death row syndrome alone has not yet
convinced any American court to overturn a death sentence.
5 9
Justice Thomas insinuated that this argument was effectively dead,
citing eight cases between the 1995 Lackey opinion and his 1999
Knight concurrence that had rejected similar claims.60 However,
the eight cases he cited only handled Lackey claims involving six
states.6 1 In fact, in at least one of these cases Thomas referred to,
the state and federal courts decided not to accept the Lackey claim
simply because there was a lack of precedent directing them to
grant relief.
62
59 Salzman, supra note 45.
60 Knight, 528 U.S. at 992-93.
61 California, Alabama, Texas, Arizona, Montana and Oklahoma. These are in
addition to Florida and Nebraska, the two states at issue in Knight.
62 The Oklahoma Criminal Appeals Court fell in this category, refusing to even
review the Lackey argument rejected by the district court because there was no
precedent otherwise and because the prisoner had failed to raise the Eighth
Amendment issue in prior proceedings. See Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d. 1025,
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Data about the practice of the death penalty across the
country does not help us predict with any certainty where states
stand on this issue. At the time of this writing, the District of
Columbia and twelve states have expressly abolished the death
penalty. 63 Five others have not executed anyone since 1976.64 Of
this second group, New Hampshire currently has no one on death
row, and New York and Kansas declared their death penalty stat-
utes unconstitutional in 2004.65 An additional thirteen states have
each executed less than five persons in the last 29 years, 66 and
thirteen states with capital punishment still on the books have
death row populations of 10 persons or fewer. 67 These figures
indicate that at least fourteen states-the twelve without the death
penalty and the two which just held their death penalty statutes
unconstitutional-would probably be amenable to an Eighth
Amendment claim that prolonged incarceration on death row could
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, if such a claim were to
reach them. Aside from this projection however, there are very few
indications that state courts have seriously considered these Eighth
Amendment claims to render this a settled issue.
This may be due in part to the fact that tenures on death
row are just now reaching unprecedented levels as we get further
away from 1976's reinstatement of capital punishment and the
length of death row residencies continues to inflate. An accurate
portrait of the national consensus is also probably obscured by the
fact that there are eighteen states that have not outright abolished
1028 (10th Cir. 1995); Stafford v. State, 899 P.2d 657, 659-60 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995).
63 Death Penalty Information Center Fact Sheet, available at http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org. These states are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
64 Id. This group includes Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and
South Dakota.
65 Id.
66 Id. Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming.
67 Id. Washington, Utah, Illinois, Nebraska, Maryland, Connecticut, Kansas,
Montana, South Dakota, Colorado, New York and New Mexico.
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the death penalty but have nevertheless invoked it with relative
infrequency (if at all); similarly, there several other states with
relatively small death row populations that have simply not
encountered this issue. All of these factors have resulted in
alarmingly few opportunities for state courts to reach the merits of
this kind of argument, and have instead largely relegated the
Lackey claim to courts in states like California, Florida, and Texas
with larger death row populations and therefore more languishing
prisoners. As such, gauging the national consensus in this arena
has become a challenging-if impossible-task.
As Justice Breyer pointed out, there were no cases between
1995 and 1999 that dealt substantially with the significance of an
Eighth Amendment claim where the state bore some responsible
for the unusual delay.6 8 Consequently, there was very little evi-
dence of state consensus on that issue when the court denied
certiorari without much elaboration in Knight. Since then, many
lower-level decisions have again neglected to reach the merits of
that sort of claim because of reliance on the Supreme Court,
assuming the issue is well-settled because certiorari was denied.
Subsequent cases raising this brand of "cruel and unusual
punishment" argument in Idaho, Mississippi, Illinois, Indiana and
Utah have had no success because courts have refused to entertain
the claim due to strict adherence to Knight,69 which wasn't even a
ruling on the merits.
70
68 Knight, 528 U.S. at 998-99.
69 McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999) (unsuccessful claim where man
had spent 17 years on death row, noting Knight v. Florida); Jordan v. State, 786
So. 2d. 987 (Miss. 2001) (unsuccessful claim where man had spent 22 years on
death row over the course of 25 years of imprisonment, with a life sentence from
1991-1998; prisoner said he suffered psychological trauma not knowing his fate
and that the state has gained nothing from the infliction of his pain; state says
there is no precedent and thus no grounds for reversal after Knight v. Florida);
Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d. 95 (Miss. 2003) (unsuccessful claims where man
had spent 14 years on death row; no precedent in light Jordan v. State and
Knight v. Florida); People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1032 (11. 2000) (unsuccessful
claim where man had been incarcerated for 15 years and his death sentence had
been vacated three times; not cruel and unusual, citing McKinney v. State);
Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46 (Ind. 2002) (unsuccessful claim in light of Knight
v. Florida where man had spent 20 years on death row); State v. Lafferty, 20
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Thus, this issue is really one of first impression. Only a
handful of states actually heard this kind of claim before Knight
virtually precluded it, and of those states which have considered it,
very few have actually written extensively on its merits. There is
even less precedent in the case of a state bearing some respon-
sibility for an inmate's unconstitutionally long stay on death row.
The simple reality is that more states than not haven't encountered
this issue and are now barred from seriously considering it. This
will continue to pose problems as we get further away from the
Gregg decision and stays on death row continue to reach unprece-
dented levels. This will be particularly problematic in those states
which have declined to carry out many executions but have
retained substantial death row populations.
B. Courts, the Bright-Line Problem and the Speedy
Trials Analog
Again, assuming the death penalty itself is not unconsti-
tutional and that a thorough appeals process assures that capital
punishment is administered less arbitrarily, then courts and legis-
latures must be able to identify the point at which a justifiable
tenancy on death row crosses over into the cruel and unusual if
they are to regard this kind of claim. In Atkins and Roper, the
P.3d 342 (Utah 2001) (unsuccessful claim where man had spent 14 years
incarcerated, mostly on death row; questions of retributive and deterrent effect
were unpersuasive because "the Supreme Court [in Knight] has recently denied
petitions for writs of certiorari.").
70 1 only found two other states that had dealt with this issue after 1999, though
this list is not exhaustive. In People v. Ochoa, 981 P.2d 79 (Cal. 2001), the
Supreme Court of California addressed the Lackey claim and the lack of
penological effect a long delay would have upon a prisoner who has been
detained over 10 years; the Court held that retribution and deterrence are
maintained in these circumstances. In Ross v. State, 787 So. 2d. 786 (Fla. 2001),
the Supreme Court of Florida stated without elaboration that an inmate's claim
was meritless where he had been on death row for 24 years. The Florida court
used this case to deny a similar claim in King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237 (Fla.
2001) to quickly dismiss a claim where an inmate had been incarcerated for a
little over ten years.
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Court could measure the "direction and consistency" of evolving
standards of decency by looking at which states had enacted or
abolished -statutes governing the use of the death penalty on
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders. The Lackey claim has no
comparable legislative or common law starting-point. Because
there are no statutes to look towards, and because there is no clear
higher court precedent on this issue, courts must look elsewhere to
determine when they may step in and say enough is enough. The
Speedy Trials cases provide some relevant insights into how the
courts can approach this sort of nuanced balancing.
In the 1972 case Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court
examined the "speedy trials" clause of the Sixth Amendment7 1 to
address the issue of whether it was unconstitutional to bring a man
to trial five years after his initial arrest. In granting certiorari, the
Court noted that "the right to speedy trial is a more vague concept
than other procedural rights. It is ... impossible to determine with
precision when the right has been denied. We cannot definitely say
how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be
swift but deliberate." 72 Similar to the dilemma posed by the vague
parameters of the Eighth Amendment Lackey claim, speedy trial
challenges ask courts to consider public justice as well as the indi-
vidual rights of the defendant. The Court declined to set a fixed
length of time at which delays awaiting trial would be automati-
cally considered unconstitutional, opting instead for a "functional
analysis of the right in the particular context of the case. 73
Barker announced the Court was to adopt a flexible
approach on an ad hoc basis: "a balancing test in which the
71 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads as follows: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72 Barker v. Wingo, 431 U.S. 514, 521 (1972).
73 Id. at 522.
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conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed. 74
These factors to be considered included the length of the delay, the
reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant.75 These last two factors are probably
not as relevant to our immediate inquiry, as the defendant's
assertion of his right to the challenge does not extend as readily to
our situation and given the fact that his Lackey claim would be
litigated in post-conviction proceedings. It is, however, helpful to
examine the other two Speedy Trials factors to inform our Eighth
Amendment determinations.
1. Length of Delay
Looking at the "speedy trials" clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court pronounced that the length of delay
awaiting trial would serve as a "triggering mechanism" for this
brand of constitutional challenge.76 The Justices noted that the
particular circumstances of the case must be evaluated in order for
the length of delay to trigger scrutiny here, as longer delays might
be more justifiable in certain circumstances. Likewise, they
explained that the Court is not required to investigate the merits of
such a claim "until there is some delay that is presumptively
prejudicial. 77 The Court has never been clear about what amount
of time renders a delay presumptively prejudicial in the Sixth
Amendment context, although the Court found that an 8 2 year
holdup between the indictment and arrest of the defendant in
Doggett v. United States was "extraordinary," noting more general-
ly that delays are presumptively prejudicial at least when they near
78
a year.
Concededly, the criteria for a deciding how long is too long
in the death row scenario is different than in the speedy trials
situations, although the process of attempting to gauge the impre-
74 Id. at 530.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 530.
77 id.
78 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.l (1992).
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cise requires a similar approach. Certainly a year on death row will
not prompt the Courts to examine this sort of Eighth Amendment
challenge, for accuracy of death penalty administration requires
appellate safeguards that ensure executions will rarely occur that
soon after initial sentencing. While courts will want to look at the
particular procedural history of each death penalty case raising this
claim, the need to evaluate the length of delay on an ad hoc basis is
probably not as pressing since each individual raising this claim
remains under the same sentence of death. Again, prejudice is also
not so much the determinative factor in a Lackey type claim
because in our case the petitioner's trial has already occurred. The
Barker considerations are still highly instructive here however,
insofar as this claim must attach to a presumptively long delay in
order to trigger judicial attention. We the then must figure out what
constitutes a presumptively long delay in the death row context.
The European Union refused to extradite Jans Soering
because of a presumption that Virginia's average of six to eight
years on death row was too long; that court did not, however,
qualify its holding to suggest what length of detention before exe-
cution would have been permissible. While American abolitionists
would likely perceive any amount of time on death row to be a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, death penalty proponents of
the Justice Thomas ilk would reject the notion that any fixed
amount of time could be presumptively inordinate. That said, a
workable standard will have to fall somewhere between those
extremes if it is to achieve any real credibility within the courts. In
that sense, it is probably least objectionable to proceed with a
determination that seeks to discover where the outer limits of
acceptability lie-that is, we must identify that point at which it
becomes patently obvious that a delay has become exceptionally
long, based on averages across the country.
Dwight Aarons, an American scholar who has closely
examined this area, has suggested that we can classify a length of
confinement on death row as "inordinate" at least once the delay
reaches twice the national average for persons executed in the
2006-2007
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United States. 79 Aarons' proposal is particularly compelling in
light of the fact that the Lackey challenge turns on an examination
of the cruel and "unusual," since twice the national average would
seem fairly unusual by most accounts. This is not to say that
periods of less than that average are not unconstitutional under this
framework; some would argue that any delay in excess of the
national average would be inordinate. However flawed, Aarons'
model nevertheless provides us with a practicable starting point
because it allows us to assume what is patently inordinate and
work backwards. Applying the current statistics gathered by the
Death Penalty Information Center then, this approach would
provide courts with the power to hear an Eighth Amendment claim
at least when a prisoner has spent twenty years and four months on
death row.
Even proceeding from this relatively conservative outer-
limit, it becomes quickly evident that the demand for an avenue of
relief in this area is staggering. The United States Department of
Justice statistics reveal that of the 7,187 people sentenced to death
since 1977, over 50% of them are still lagging on death rows
nationwide. 80 This figure breaks down in a drastic way at the
individual state-level, particularly as we observe states like Cali-
fornia which retain death row populations at rates inconsistent with
their actual executions. With 648 persons awaiting execution there,
the largest death row population of any state in the country, 8 1
California has executed a dozen people since it resumed the
practice of capital punishment in 1978.8 The Death Row Tracking
records of The California Department of Corrections reveal of
those 648 people, 106 of them have been on death row since 1985
79 Dwight Aarons, Criminal Law: Getting Out of This Mess: Steps Toward
Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology I (Fall 1998).
80 Bonczar, supra note 29. 13% have been executed, 4% died in some other
manner, and 37% received some other disposition.
8 Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 63. Second is Texas, with 414,
and Third is Florida, with 388.
82 Id.
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or before. 83 That means there are currently 106 people in Califor-
nia alone whose time spent on death row would presumptively
trigger an Eighth Amendment investigation under the conservative
length-of-delay standard propagated here.
The argument for establishing a presumptive triggering
device is more compelling in light of these kinds of trends, as sheer
utility counsels that emerging crises like the one in California must
allow courts to step in at some point and decide when the impo-
sition of life in prison might be constitutionally warranted in place
of a death sentence. Beginning with the presumption that delays
are at least unreasonably long when they reach twice the national
average, Courts may proceed to examine in more detail the
particulars of the case. Without such a mechanism in place, death
row residencies will continue to reach unimaginable levels, over-
loaded state systems will see their resources drained, and further
Eighth Amendment concerns will be implicated.
2. Reason for Delay
Returning to the Speedy Trials analog, Barker instructed
that after a certain delay is held to be presumptively excessive,
courts may begin to examine the government's reasons for the
holdup in order to make their ruling on constitutionality. "Here,
too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons."
84
The Court clarified: "A deliberate attempt to delay ... should be
weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason
such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less
heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the govern-
ment and not with the defendant." 85 It also states that reasons for
delay which pertain to ensuring the accuracy of the proceedings,
83 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult
Operations, Death Row Tracking Records, Condemned Inmate Summary List.
Dec. 2, 2005, available at http://www.corr.ca.gov/CommunicationsOffice/
CapitalPunishment/PDF/Summary.pdf.
84 Barker, 431 U.S. at 531.
85 id.
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such as attempting to find a missing witness, would be valid and
legitimate for the government to justify putting off trial.86
This Eighth Amendment challenge will also need to survey
the interests of both sides in its consideration. Justice Stevens
suggested as much in Lackey, when he first proposed that this kind
of claim might be able to hold water in courts: "It may be appro-
priate to distinguish, for example, among delays resulting from
(a) a petitioner's abuse of the judicial system by escape or repeti-
tive, frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner's legitimate exercise of his
right to review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the
State. 87
As noted elsewhere in this paper, a prisoner's own attempt
to manipulate the system will not serve as the proper foundation
for a Lackey claim of inordinate delay. However, it is worth noting
that this sort of defendant would rarely experience delays reaching
the extraordinary levels discussed at length here. As Aarons indi-
cates, a long delay often implies that the capital case was a very
difficult one to prosecute against a particular defendant, and that
the decision to seek the death penalty in that case was probably
debatable from the beginning.88 Likewise, "the delay in carrying
out the death penalty also may reflect a consensus by several actors
in the capital litigation process-such as subsequent prosecutors,
juries, state and federal judges, and governors-that the defendant
is not truly deserving of death" due to possibilities of subsequent
rehabilitation or new emerging facts. 89 Indeed, it seems logical that
the so-called "slam-dunk" capital cases are not the ones which
defendants could effectively stretch out across decades, no matter
how many frivolous appeals are filed. That said, as long as capital
defendants are acting legitimately in pursuing and exhausting
review of their own life or death determinations, they should not be
excluded from the protections of the Eighth Amendment.
Citing to a report made by the American Bar Association,
Aarons concluded that "when there has been an inordinate delay
86 id.
87 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.
88 Aarons, supra note 79, at 53.
89 id.
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between the imposition of the sentence and the pending execution,
the state is usually directly responsible for a great part of the
delay." 90 Most delays are procedural failings on the part of state
court systems, and can be attributable to ineffectiveness of appoin-
ted counsel, slowness in processing of records, cumbersome state
policies and procedures, and uncertainty regarding constitutional
and habeas law, among other things.9' None of these causes of the
delay are directly attributable to the prisoner, whose psychological
trauma has often only increased as his confinement drags on, the
faint prospect of an overturned death sentence flickering unpromis-
ingly with each new phase of litigation.
The Illinois Supreme Court decision People v. Simms
underscores the need for courts to take the reasons for delay into
account when deciding whether or not the Eighth Amendment
supports granting relief. In 2000, that court rejected most of an
inmate's claims-including his Lackey argument-but reversed
and remanded to hold an evidentiary hearing on a claim that
perjury had affected his death penalty sentence.92 Chief Justice
Harrison forcefully dissented to draw direct attention to the Lackey
issue lingering above this prisoner's 15 years on and off of death
row during "extraordinarily protracted" litigation. During this time
period, the inmate's death sentence had been vacated three times
for procedural error and each time the state had sought to reinstate
it. The Chief Justice was unmoved by the notion that death row
inmates must suffer such long delays as a consequence of their
own decision to avail themselves to the appeals process.93 He
conceded that such reasoning would have force if many claims
reaching him were largely frivolous attempts made only with the
intention of postponing execution, but this was rarely the reality in
the Illinois court system; there, most capital cases dragging on
longer than a decade were addressing prosecutorial errors or issues
of ineffective representation, and not merit-less arguments brought
90 
Id. at 48.
91 Id
92 People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1032 (111. 2000).
9' Id. at 1143.
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by defendants. Of course the state must have the opportunity to
retry defective cases; however:
[t]here must be a point ... at which the court steps in
and says enough is enough. Beyond a certain number of
years and a certain number of failed attempts by the
State to secure a constitutionally valid sentence of
death, the litigation becomes a form of torture in and of
itself. It is as if the State were holding a defective pistol
to the defendant's head day and night for years on end
and the weapon kept misfiring. It may eventually go
off, but then again, it may not, and the defendant has no
94way to be sure.
Here, where there was at least some evidence that the state
had deliberately sought to procure the prisoner's death sentence by
knowingly using perjured testimony, the absence of authority
allowing the court to grant relief posed significant problems.
Courts must be able to take the reasons for the delay into consi-
deration when determining if an Eighth Amendment violation has
occurred. Courts would be remiss not to recognize the unconsti-
tutionality of extraordinary periods on death rows which are
largely attributable to the state.
C. How to Legislate Around Death Row Syndrome
and Competing Concerns
Whereas the speedy trials problem was somewhat mitigated
by statutes of limitations on the prosecution of certain crimes, no
state or federal legislation yet establishes a statute of limitations
addressing the point at which a punishment becomes cruel and
unusual once a prisoner has spent an abnormally long time
awaiting execution. Silence in this area might be understood in
light of Justice Thomas's assertion that "consistency would seem
94 Id. at 1 144.
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to demand that those who accept our death penalty jurisprudence
as a given also accept the lengthy delay between sentencing and
execution as a necessary consequence." 95 The system changes each
year, and this logic may help explain why states are hesitant to fix
specific statutory limits for death row incarceration, lest prisoners
continually appeal and then claim they'd been too long incar-
cerated. However, this line of reasoning is countervailed by the
danger of extraordinary delays due in large part to state failings,
discussed above. Again, the state has a very real stake in estab-
lishing such legislation where death row populations are swelling,
delays are reaching unprecedented levels, and the system is
growing increasingly clogged. Much like the balancing courts will
have to do, legislatures attempting to provide statutory governance
of cruel and unusual death row delays must address these
competing interests.
Dwight Aarons has suggested that there are four common
objections to death row syndrome/Lackey-type claims which
explain why petitioners have had little success in the American
context: 1) the inmate caused the delay; 2) it would be unfair to
other death row inmates to recognize the claim; 3) recognition of
the claim would disrupt the administration of capital punishment;
and 4) the appropriate remedy for inordinate delay is to apply for
executive clemency. 96 He asserts that these qualms are not rooted
in a realistic understanding of the death penalty litigation process,
where in actuality, lengthy delays are more typically the result of
the state's failure "to vigorously respect the rights of capital
defendants," and "to carry out the execution as aggressively as it
sought and obtained the death sentence." 97 Either way, Aarons'
premises are instructive in any attempt to fashion legislation that
seeks to properly balance competing values. I propose the follow-
ing guidelines for crafting legislation on the state level to ensure
the Eighth Amendment is upheld.
9' Knight, 528 U.S. at 992.
96 Aarons, supra note 79, at 44.
9 7 1d. at 22.
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1. Legislation must guard against the possibility that an
inmate could cause his own delay, but it also must provide for
Eighth Amendment relief when a state is primarily responsible for
that delay.
We have already concluded that it seldom happens where a
prisoner aggressively litigates frivolous claims and then charges
that the delay in his execution violates the Eighth Amendment. In
those few instances where an inmate could do that, however, then
providing for a length of delay triggering mechanism in state
statutes-such as the outer-limit one proposed above for courts-
would help guard against this danger. Establishing a presumptively
inordinate delay at twice the national average would weed out
those litigants seeking to manipulate the system, because it would
rarely if ever be the case that such claims would survive for such
an extraordinary length of time. If a litigant sought to continually
raise "frivolous" claims and was successful to the point that he had
managed to last on death row for over two decades, then chances
are that those claims were not really all that frivolous to begin with
and there was probably some more serious defect in the
proceedings.
That said, legislation must provide for relief when an
inmate has spent at least this amount of time on death row due to
failings on the part of the state. This will mostly be the case when
this claim is raised. In such instances, legislation should provide
for life in prison instead of prolonged exposure to death row.
Legislating in this area will have the effect of making states more
careful in seeking the death penalty in the first place, while
providing incentive to conduct their capital proceedings more
diligently.
2. Legislation must apply equally to all prisoners.
An Eight Amendment challenge must apply with equal
force to all inmates on death row. Objectors to the availability of
this kind of relief allege that it is inherently unfair, given the
possibility that if two prisoners were sentenced to death on the
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same day, varying durations of appeals proceedings could mean
that only one of them will have the opportunity to raise this claim.
That argument is not very persuasive in light of the arguments in
favor of this challenge, and unfortunately it only highlights the
arbitrariness which inevitably characterizes the entire system of
capital punishment, not this claim specifically. Aarons responded
to this by reminding objectors that "throughout the law ... such
demarcations exist. These lines mark the difference between, for
instance, what facts state a cause of action or by when a party has
to file his legal claim. The criminal law is not exempt from this
line-drawing.,
98
While legislation can attempt to make this claim equally
accessible to all death row prisoners by establishing a universal
length-of-delay presumption, collateral review procedures will still
be exhausted at different rates from case to case. The only way
around this is to reform capital processing systems and attempt to
streamline the way different courts across the state approach these
types of cases. Legislators might agree that this might entail an
overhaul of the entire system.
99
3. Legislation must preserve the safeguards that seek to
maximize efficiency within the administration of capital punish-
ment.
If we assume that delays are largely borne out the state's
desire to be painstakingly careful before determining to carry out
an execution, and that long tenures on death row are just a function
of the system's many safeguards to ensure efficiency, then there is
concern that this kind of claim would lead to shoddier litigation
where the state would rush towards execution. Certainly this kind
of scenario would be counterproductive to the underlying rationale
for the Eighth Amendment claim.
98 Id. at 53.
99 Aarons suggests these areas for reform will necessarily include: state court
systems, Defense Services, Protecting Against Executing Factually or legally
innocent persons, and reconsidering the roles of prosecutors, judges, defense
attorneys, and the public.
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Aarons proposes that the solution to this is to require that
after such delay, the state must prove its need to now carry out the
execution.1°° Placing this burden on the state would closely
resemble the procedural requirements now in place for executing
an individual who has recently declared himself insane while
awaiting execution. "Similarly to insane capital defendants,
inordinate delay claimants are challenging a legal classification
into which they entered after the commission of the capital offense.
The state should prove that the defendant is no longer within that
class of defendants before it executes him."'' 1 Along the same line,
providing for such a claim should not mean that prisoners are
armed with any fewer avenues for appeal. All of the safeguards
currently operating to protect death row litigants should remain in
place to ensure the integrity of the system where the stakes are so
high.
4. Legislation must maintain appropriate alternatives.
Some opponents suggest that clemency is the remedy for
those prisoners seeking review of their death sentence because of
mitigating or intervening factors. They contend that there are other
systems in place to address the problems wrought by inordinate
delays. The problem with this reasoning is that clemency fails to
adequately address many of the issues included herein and is not
even granted very often anymore, meaning that clemency is not
really a significant avenue of relief for capital defendants. Fur-
thermore, "capital defendants who have been on death row for an
inordinate length of time are not immune from the political aspects
of the clemency decision" especially since length of delay has
rarely had any impact on the decision to grant relief historically.' 0 2
That said, legislation should nonetheless continue to provide a
clemency appeal option for that very narrow set of cases that might
be able to benefit from it, but it should not presume that clemency
I' d. at 56.
101 Id.
1
02 Id. at 63.
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adequate fulfills the function that an Eighth Amendment inordinate
delay challenge does.
5. Legislation must address the other causes of death row
syndrome.
While excessive time spent on death row awaiting execu-
tion is the hallmark of this claim, the actual conditions on death
row markedly contribute to the psychological deterioration of
inmates. Length of delay and conditions of confinement are
inextricably linked in the death row phenomenon, a sentiment
made particularly apparent in the State v. Ross case from Connec-
ticut which is discussed in Section II. There, the former warden
testified that the death row environment was much like being con-
fined to a submarine or cave. The affidavits there also showed that
the attitude of the guards contributed greatly to Ross's psycholo-
gical infirmity, as they repeatedly made comments that could have
been construed as encouragement to commit suicide.
Statistics figuring into the amount of time a death row
inmate must spend in solitary confinement also implicates notions
of cruel and unusual punishment, especially where solitary con-
finement methods were not initially designed to accommodate for
prisoners now spending in excess of two decades on death row.
Nick Yarris, a man who was exonerated by DNA evidence after
spending 23 years on death row in Pennsylvania for a crime he did
not commit, reported in the documentary "After Innocence" that
for the first two years of his confinement he was not allowed to
speak at all. 10 3 All of this testimony only begins to scratch the
surface of what the actual conditions on death row entail, and the
Eighth Amendment significance when these delays are unusually
protracted. Since death row residencies are reaching unprecedented
levels and will continue to, legislators must be proactive about
addressing each of these elements specifically and providing for
more humane conditions of confinement.
103 "After Innocence," 2005. See http://www.afterinnocence.com for more infor-
mation about the project.
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CONCLUSION
Death row syndrome is a concept with a great deal of legal
importance, especially since death row tenures in excess of
decades are becoming increasingly commonplace across the
United States. This phenomenon is particularly significant given
that it is recognized elsewhere in the world and foreign govern-
ments are growing more reluctant to extradite criminals here
because of the potential for extraordinary delays before execution.
In the absence of outright abolition of the death penalty, courts and
legislatures should evaluate this Eighth Amendment claim as one
of first impression, and determine that the constitutional question is
raised at least when a prisoner has spent more than twice the
national average amount of time in death row confinement. Courts
and legislatures must then carefully balance competing interests to
provide for relief where it is necessary.
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